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A New Era of Federal Prescribed Fire: Defining 
Terminology and Properly Applying the Discretionary 
Function Exception 
Robert H. Palmer III† 
Fire cultivates change. This article illustrates how the use of pre-
scribed fire changed over the last century and how the federal 
courts resolved tort claims resulting from prescribed fires. By first 
recounting the tumultuous history of prescribed fire and the per-
plexing terminology used to describe the various categories of 
wildland fires, this article then dissects prescribed fire litigation. In 
particular, this article explains why recent policy changes have ex-
posed the federal government from behind the discretionary func-
tion exception that typically shields the federal government from 
tort liability. Thus, this article clarifies confusing terminology and 
describes why the discretionary function exception should not bar a 
claim for damages resulting from a prescribed fire. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the first time, the Forestry Division hired crews to suppress a 
wildfire . . . . A heavy snowfall finally extinguished the fire in the fall, 
although a telegram to Washington reported, “through our heroic efforts 
the fire has been put out.” 
—Charles Deloney (circa 1900)1 
 Although humans have always had a relationship with fire, the 
relationship experienced dramatic changes in the last century. As society 
expanded westward during the early half of the twentieth century, the 
human-fire relationship waned to its lowest level. Fire was perceived as a 
threat, similar to that of an enemy in war, and the federal government 
responded by dispatching the Army to aggressively fight fire.2 For many 
communities in the West, fire was the enemy that initiated its attack with 
a flash of lightning and the rumble of thunder. However, after waging a 
war against fire for nearly fifty years, the perception of fire slowly 
changed as federal land managers and society recognized the detrimental 
effects of aggressive fire suppression: it was expensive, it caused 
significant environmental damage, and it caused public land to become 
more vulnerable to future fires.3 
                                                 
1. JOHN DAUGHERTY, NAT’L PARK SERV., GRAND TETON HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY (1999), 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/grte2/hrs17.htm (last updated July 24, 2004) 
(quoting Charles “Pap” Deloney, who was the first forest supervisor and who sent the telegram circa 
1900).   
2. The Army was used extensively from 1872 to about 1916 to fight fires on federal land be-
cause the various modern fire agencies, like the National Park Service, did not exist yet or did not 
have sufficient resources to control fires. HAL K. ROTHMAN, A TEST OF ADVERSITY AND 
STRENGTH: WILDLAND FIRE IN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/fir_wil_history.pdf. 
3. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 120–24; Biodiversity Assocs. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1156–
57 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that fire suppression efforts created unintended consequences: denser 
forests and greater fire risks). 
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 Instead of aggressive fire suppression, the human-fire relationship 
changed as society recognized the importance of fire. During the middle 
of the twentieth century, the primary federal land agencies—the U.S. 
Forest Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land 
Management, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs4—experimented with fire by allowing some fires to burn 
naturally and even intentionally igniting other fires.5 At the same time, 
Congress enacted environmental laws to give the federal land agencies 
direction regarding how to better manage federal lands.6 The human-fire 
relationship began to evolve. 
 In the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century, our 
relationship with fire—specifically prescribed fire7—reached a point at 
which society accepted that civilization and fire could coexist.8 Society 
finally recognized that fire was not only necessary for many species to 
survive, but it was also a necessary tool that could improve the health of 
public lands and protect communities. At the same time, the federal land 
agencies created a unified prescribed fire policy, which enabled more use 
of prescribed fire than ever before.9 Ultimately, the federal land 
agencies’ increased use of prescribed fire will minimize wildfire threats 
to communities, but that protective benefit has a risk: an increased 
likelihood of prescribed fire tort litigation. Because prescribed fires will 
                                                 
4. In this article, the term “federal land agencies” refers only to those five federal agencies that 
have wildland fire programs and are represented at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, 
Idaho. Although three other agencies—National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Depart-
ment of Homeland Security U.S. Fire Administration, and the Department of the Interior’s National 
Business Center Aviation Management Directorate—are also affiliated with the National Interagen-
cy Fire Center, this article does not directly apply to them because they do not manage federal land. 
Additionally, because the National Association of State Foresters is not a federal agency, this article 
does not apply to it either. About NIFC, NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., 
http://www.nifc.gov/aboutNIFC/about_mission.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
5. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 120–24.  
6. For example, Congress enacted the Wilderness Act on September 3, 1964, which changed 
the fire response in wilderness areas. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 1, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2011)); ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at iii. The National Environmental 
Policy Act was enacted on January 1, 1970. National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 
§ 2, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2011)).  
7. The term “prescribed fire” is defined in more detail in Part III as a human-caused fire inten-
tionally ignited, with authority, to achieve specific objectives identified in an approved prescribed 
fire plan. Unlike a “wildfire,” which is an unplanned fire, a “prescribed fire” is a planned fire. Addi-
tionally, the term “wildland fire” refers to both “wildfires” and “prescribed fires.” 
8. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 120. 
9. Fire Information—Wildland Fire Statistics: Prescribed Fires and Acres by Agency, NAT’L 
INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_prescribed.html (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2012) [hereinafter NIFC Fire Statistics] (indicating that national prescribed fire reporting 
began in 1998). 
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inevitably burn out of control, escape,10 and burn unintended property, 
those resulting damage claims are likely to increase as the federal land 
agencies increase the use of prescribed fire.11  
 Unfortunately, the legal framework used to address prescribed fire 
tort litigation is obscured with misleading and conflicting terminology. 
As the human-fire relationship changed, the use of prescribed fire waxed 
and waned, and the federal land agencies also changed the terminology 
used to describe fire, especially prescribed fire. Instead of using 
consistent terminology, the federal land agencies described prescribed 
fire through a potpourri of terms, which confused the public, the 
employees, and the courts.12 Recently, the federal land agencies 
confronted this problem and issued new policies to simplify fire 
terminology, which also had the effect of altering fire classification 
systems.13 Fortunately, the new fire terminology and classification 
policies should reduce public confusion and simplify the federal 
government’s defense during litigation. 
 In addition to recent fire policy changes, the law governing the 
federal government’s liability resulting from a prescribed fire is also 
changing.14 As described in Part IV, the discretionary function exception 
to the Federal Tort Claims Act generally barred any prescribed fire 
damage claim from even reaching trial.15 However, recent policy 
directives and a Florida district court’s decision in 2010 should curtail 
the use of the discretionary function exception in any litigation where a 
                                                 
10. “Escape” is a term of art used to describe an uncontrolled prescribed fire that exceeds the 
boundaries of the prescribed fire perimeter.  
11. E.g., Michigan v. United States, No. 2:11-CV-00303, 2011 WL 7267049 (W.D. Mich. filed 
Aug. 12, 2011) (currently litigating a motion to dismiss based on the discretionary function excep-
tion because a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire escaped and allegedly damaged $85,000 of state 
lands). See generally Paul Keller, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, Prescribed Fire Escapes: 
Are We Learning Anything?, TWO MORE CHAINS, Winter 2012, at 1, available at 
http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Two_More_Chains_Winter_2012.pdf (discussing the uptick in 
the number of recent prescribed fire escapes and feedback to the current prescribed fire review pro-
cess).  
12. See Memorandum from the NWCG Chair to NWCG Committee Chairs and Geographic 
Area Coordinating Group, NWCG#030-2010, at 1 (July 8, 2010), [hereinafter NWCG#030-2010] 
available at http://www.nwcg.gov/general/memos/nwcg-030-2010.pdf (describing the additional 
guidance for communicating about managing wildland fire in light of changes in policy guidance 
and terminology). 
13. Id.  
14. Jonathan Yoder, Liability, Regulation, and Endogenous Risk: The Incidence and Severity 
of Escaped Prescribed Fires in the United States, 51 J.L. & ECON. 297, 320 (2008) (discussing the 
effects of different prescribed fire laws and concluding that “empirical analysis provides evidence 
that different liability and regulatory rules affect the number and magnitude of escaped prescribed 
fires.”). 
15. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011); e.g., Thune v. United States, 872 F. 
Supp. 921, 922 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding the discretionary function exception barred the damage 
claim resulting from an escaped prescribed fire). 
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federal land agency’s prescribed fire escapes and damages non-federal 
property.16 
  Part II of this article provides background information describing 
how and why the federal land agencies use prescribed fire. Part III 
describes how the new fire terminology policy changes have altered the 
fire classification schemes and why the new terminology and 
classification policy will improve the federal land agencies’ ability to 
communicate about fire, specifically prescribed fire. Part IV examines 
the prescribed fire jurisprudence in light of recent policy directives. 
Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating that federal land agencies need to 
embrace the terminology and classification policy, and it also describes 
why the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Acts 
should not shield the federal land agencies from prescribed fire tort 
claims. 
II. PRESCRIBED FIRE BACKGROUND 
The presence or absence of natural fire within a given habitat is 
recognized as one of the ecological factors contributing to the 
perpetuation of plants and animals native to that habitat. 
—National Park Service (circa 1968)17 
A. History of Federal Prescribed Fire  
 Historically, society and the government considered fire an enemy 
and responded by aggressively suppressing any fire.18 For nearly a 
century, from 1872 until the 1960s, a predominately human-centered 
value system considered fire a threat to society and community 
development. Under that view, any fire was aggressively suppressed 
because fire represented an unwanted nuisance to the expanding way of 
life.19 In 1935, the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) had fully embraced 
society’s resentment toward fire when the USFS adopted the 10 AM 
Policy.20 The 10 AM Policy directed USFS fire resources to aggressively 
                                                 
16. See discussion infra Part IV; NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., INTERAGENCY 
PRESCRIBED FIRE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES GUIDE 19 (July 2008) [hereinafter 
2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE], available at http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/RxFire/rxfireguide.pdf 
(describing current, as of Mar. 25, 2012, federal prescribed fire policy); Florida v. United States, No. 
4:09-CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2010).  
17. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 120. 
18. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 2.  
19. Jan W. van Wagtendonk, Fires in Wilderness in the National Parks, PARK SCIENCE, Feb. 
21, 2012, at 20, available at http://www.nature.nps.gov/parkscience/index.cfm?ArticleID=535 (de-
scribing that fire suppression dominated fire policy from 1886 to 1967). 
20. NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND 
FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY 1-1 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE 
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suppress all human-caused fires and to contain any fire by 10 a.m. the 
next day.21 The 10 AM Policy became the dominant fire policy for the 
United States for the next forty years. During that time, the 10 AM 
Policy was incredibly effective: fire durations decreased considerably, 
and the amount of acreage burned dropped dramatically.22 However, the 
National Park Service (NPS) did not fully embrace the USFS’s 10 AM 
Policy of aggressive fire suppression. 
 The traditionally human-centered focus shifted towards a more 
ecologic-centered focus as scientists, land managers, and politicians 
recognized the importance of fire. In the 1960s, the NPS continued to 
suppress fires, but the NPS also initiated a new era of fire management: 
some lightning-caused fires were allowed to burn, and the use of 
prescribed fires became more prevalent.23 In addition, by the early 1960s 
the NPS recognized the need to restore fire within the national parks. At 
the same time, Congress enacted the Wilderness Act, which directed 
federal land agencies to allow natural processes, like fire, to occur in 
wilderness areas.24 Although the NPS was moving away from fire 
suppression in the 1960s, the USFS maintained the 10 AM Policy for 
another decade. 
 Responding to exponentially increasing fire suppression costs and 
recognizing the potential value of allowing some fires to burn naturally, 
in 1977, the USFS shelved the 10 AM Policy.25 Like the NPS, the USFS 
adopted similar wildland fire policies that shifted from strict fire 
suppression to more holistic fire management.26 After this change, the 
federal land agencies increased the use of prescribed fire and allowed 
                                                                                                             
MANAGEMENT POLICY], available at http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/h
istory/index.htm. 
21. Id.  
22. 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY, supra note 20, at 1-6. 
23. Gregory H. Aplet, Evolution of Wilderness Fire Policy, INT’L J. WILDERNESS, Apr. 2006, 
at 9, available at http://www.wilderness.net/library/documents/IJWApr06_Aplet.pdf. 
24. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2011) (Wilderness areas “shall be adminis-
tered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unim-
paired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these 
areas, the preservation of their wilderness character . . . .”). See generally Sierra Club v. Block, 622 
F. Supp. 842, 850 (D. Colo. 1985) (describing the purpose and legislative history of the Wilderness 
Act); FIRE MGMT. POLICY REVIEW TEAM, 1988 REPORT ON FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY 54 (Dec. 
14, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW], available at http://www.nwcg.go
v/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/mission/1988_fire_mgmt_preview_team_rpt.pdf;  
Aplet, supra note 23, at 9.  
25. 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY, supra note 20, at 1-1. 
26. Id.; see also Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh'g denied 
(2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2878 (2009) (stating in 1968 the USFS ended its policy of mandatory 
wildfire suppression that began in 1911, and, instead, the USFS replaced it with a selective suppres-
sion policy). 
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some lightning-caused fires to burn naturally.27 This “let it burn” policy 
came under significant criticism from the public and politicians in 
response to the 1988 Greater Yellowstone fires.28 Although lightning, 
not humans, ignited the 1988 Greater Yellowstone fires, many of these 
fires were improperly classified as prescribed natural fires because the 
fires were allowed to burn naturally.29 While the classification of fires 
has caused turmoil ever since the 1988 Greater Yellowstone fires, the 
federal land agencies have continued managing fire, especially 
prescribed fire, for multiple benefits. 
B. Benefits and Consequences of Prescribed Fire 
 Prescribed fire is a tool that land managers now use to improve 
ecosystems and to reduce wildfire risks to communities.30 When used for 
ecosystem benefit, a prescribed fire burns vulnerable vegetation, releases 
nutrients contained in that burned material, and recycles those nutrients 
by initiating the ecologic cycle.31 Some ecosystems, like pine or giant 
sequoia dominated forests, cannot regenerate without some type of fire 
disturbance that causes the cones to open to initiate the reproduction 
cycle.32 Those species that require fire to release their seeds for 
germination have serotinous cones and are located in many ecosystems 
across the country.33 In addition, some animal species, like birds or 
squirrels, are also dependent upon post-fire habitat.34 When prescribed 
                                                 
27. Federico Cheever, The Phantom Menace and the Real Cause: Lessons from Colorado’s 
Hayman Fire 2002, 18 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 191–92 (2010) (describing that in 1977 the 
USFS allowed more prescribed burning as “[f]ire suppression became fire management.”). 
28. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 186; Aplet, supra note 23, at 9; Peter H. Froelicher, Issues of 
Liability Surrounding Fire Management in the Greater Yellowstone Area, 27 LAND & WATER L. 
REV. 123, 124 (1992) (describing that the Greater Yellowstone fires “stirred a heated debate con-
cerning the proper fire management policy”). 
29. 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 1. 
30. NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., NFES 2724, INTERAGENCY STANDARDS FOR FIRE AND 
FIRE AVIATION OPERATIONS 17-1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 REDBOOK], available at 
http://www.nifc.gov/PUBLICATIONS/redbook/2012/2012RedBookALL.pdf (PDF page 286) (ex-
plaining that hazardous fuels reduction programs, which include prescribed fire, reduce hazardous 
fuels and improve the health of the land).  
31. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 610 (D.C. Minn. 1973). 
32. Id. (stating that jack pine cones will open and allow dispersal of its seeds only if subjected 
to the intense heat of a fire); California v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (giant sequoia). 
33. George Wuerthner, Fire in the East: Welcoming Back a Native Son, in WILDFIRE: A 
CENTURY OF FAILED FOREST POLICY 96 (George Wuerthner ed., 2006). 
34. Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) (black-backed wood-
pecker); San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Stiles, No. 1:08-CV-00144, 2010 WL 1780816, at *14 (D. 
Colo. May 3, 2010) (hairy woodpecker and bluebird); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 
1:05-CV-00372, 2006 WL 4109661, at *28 (D. N.M. Aug. 22, 2006) (Albert's squirrel). 
286 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:279 
fire is used for ecosystem benefits the fires tend to be large, on the order 
of hundreds to thousands of acres.35 
 In addition to ecosystem restoration, land managers also use 
prescribed fire in conjunction with other fuel treatments to reduce the 
risks associated with wildfires. Any burnable material, like dry brush, is 
considered a fuel.36 Additionally, a hazardous fuel consists of readily 
combustible materials that are arranged in a way that makes fire control 
difficult and likely causes undesired consequences if burned.37 For 
example, highly combustible dense brush, like chaparral, adjacent to a 
house would be considered a hazardous fuel because once the chaparral 
ignites the resulting fire would likely threaten the house.38 The physical 
act of fuel removal is called a fuel treatment or a hazard fuel reduction 
project.39 
 Land managers use fuel treatments and prescribed fire to protect 
people, communities, and ecosystems from subsequent wildfires.40 
Because prescribed fires consume the same fuel necessary to sustain a 
wildfire, an area previously burned by a prescribed fire has less fuel 
available. Thus, any subsequent fire burns at a lower intensity, and lower 
intensity fires are easier to manage than higher intensity fires.41 
Therefore, when prescribed fire is used to reduce the risk of subsequent 
wildfires, the prescribed fire also tends to be of a lower intensity and 
smaller size than a prescribed fire used for ecosystem benefit. Sometimes 
                                                 
35. E.g., Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921, 922 (D. Wyo. 1995) (conducting a 3,000-
acre fire to improve elk habitat). 
36. NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., GLOSSARY OF WILDLAND FIRE TERMINOLOGY 
PMS 205, at 88 (May 2011) [hereinafter GLOSSARY], available at http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/g
lossary/pms205.pdf (defining “fuel” as “[a]ny combustible material, especially petroleum-based 
products and wildland fuels”). 
37. GLOSSARY, supra note 36, at 95 (defining “hazard fuel” as “[a] fuel complex defined by 
kind, arrangement, volume, condition, and location that presents a threat of ignition and resistance to 
control”).  
38. See, e.g., POWAY CAL. MUN. CODE § 8.76.010 (2011), available at http://www.codepublis
hing.com/ca/poway/html/poway08/poway0876.html (describing that removal of highly flammable 
chaparral vegetation reduces the risk of wildfire to a structure by creating defensible space); Defen-
sible Space, CITY OF POWAY (June 25, 2010), http://www.poway.org/Index.aspx?page=455 (de-
scribing the City of Poway’s defensible space program).  
39. Glossary of Terms, FORESTS & RANGELANDS (May 5, 2011), http://www.forestsandrangel
ands.gov/resources/glossary/h.shtml (defining “hazard fuel reduction”). 
40. 2012 REDBOOK, supra note 30 (describing that hazardous fuels reduction programs, which 
include prescribed fire, reduce hazardous fuels and improve the health of the land); W. Watersheds 
Project v. Lane, No. 1:07-CV-0394, 2007 WL 2815039, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2007) (describing 
the Department of Interior’s and the Department of Agriculture’s creation of a hazard fuel categori-
cal exclusions in response to the Healthy Forest Initiative in 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814 (June 5, 2003). 
41. See NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., NFES 0065, FIRELINE HANDBOOK 91–94 
(2004), available at http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/410-1/410-1.pdf (PDF pages 95–98) (describ-
ing that at low intensities direct attack tactics can be used, but at higher intensities indirect attack 
tactics must be used). 
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a prescribed fire can be as small as a campfire to burn fuel accumulated 
as a result of a fuel treatment.42 
 The use of prescribed fire, however, can also impair individuals and 
the environment. Like any fire, prescribed fires emit smoke, and smoke 
affects air quality.43 Although wildfire smoke may contribute to climate 
change, the increased use of prescribed fire, as opposed to higher 
intensity wildfires, may actually mitigate the rate of climate change.44 
Moreover, prescribed fires occasionally burn unintended property and 
occasionally affect aesthetic values because prescribed fire is inherently 
subject to many uncontrollable environmental factors—fuel 
characteristics, wind gusts, changes in wind direction, cloud movement 
and formation, and rapid changes in relative humidity.45 Thus, 
environmental factors can alter the use of prescribed fire. 
 Prescribed fire projects conducted by the federal land agencies, 
most notably those of the USFS, have also been challenged in court 
because the federal land agency allegedly did not properly consider the 
various interests or effects of a proposed project.46 Normally, a 
prescribed fire project is developed pursuant to a general land 
management plan or is associated with a broader fuel reduction plan, and 
those umbrella plans can generate significant litigation.47 For example, in 
the mid-2000s, environmental interest groups litigated numerous 
commercial timber harvesting projects, which included prescribed fire 
treatments, for allegedly failing to comply with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).48 Specifically, in Sierra Club v. 
                                                 
42. Sierra Nevada Forest Prot. Campaign v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 04-CV-2023, 2005 WL 
1366507, at *15 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2005) (describing the relationship between prescribed fire and 
other fuel treatments); Whites Creek Pile Burning Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest, U.S. FOREST 
SERV. (2007), http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/fire/hfr/2007/whitescreek_1.shtml (describing campfire sized 
prescribed fires to reduce hazardous fuel loading around a housing development). 
43. E.g., Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing that pre-
scribed fire and logging have potential impacts on air, soil, water quality, wildlife, and forest re-
sources). 
44. Christine Wiedinmyer & Matthew D. Hurteau, Prescribed Fire as a Means of Reducing 
Forest Carbon Emissions in the Western United States, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1926 (2010) (de-
scribing the relative benefits of prescribed fire as compared to wildfire and the effects on climate 
change). 
45. E.g., Robinson v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (personal injury 
and property damage claim); Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (property 
damage claim).  
46. E.g., Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (involving the 
USFS and alleging National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and National Forest Management 
Act violations). 
47. E.g., Wildwest Inst. v. Bull, 547 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (involving the USFS and alleg-
ing NEPA, National Forest Management Act, and Healthy Forests Restoration Act violations). 
48. E.g., Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding the 
USFS did not satisfy the "hard look" test required of NEPA for the 2002 Fuel categorical exclusion). 
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Bosworth, the Sierra Club challenged a USFS categorical exclusion to 
NEPA that excluded the following projects from the NEPA analysis: all 
fuel reduction projects up to 1000 acres and prescribed fire projects up to 
4500 acres on all national forests.49 In granting a preliminary injunction, 
the court agreed with the Sierra Club and concluded the USFS failed to 
demonstrate that it made a reasoned decision based on all the competing 
factors.50 
 Although legal challenges to hazard fuel projects usually originate 
from environmental interest groups, a timber harvest interest group also 
challenged the USFS for not appropriately balancing timber production, 
wildfire risk, and recreation interests.51 In California Forestry Ass'n v. 
Bosworth, the district court granted the USFS summary judgment on all 
challenges except the NEPA claim, which it granted summary judgment 
in favor of the timber interest group because the USFS failed to consider 
all the reasonable alternatives.52  
 Finally, the use of prescribed fire has also been challenged for 
adversely impacting vulnerable populations of specific species.53 Even 
after numerous legal challenges, the federal land agencies have actually 
increased the use of prescribed fire. 
Figure 1. Federal Prescribed Fire Trends, 1988 to 2011.54 
                                                 
49. Id. at 1018. 
50. Id. at 1026. 
51. Cal. Forestry Ass'n v. Bosworth, No. 2:05-CV-00905, 2008 WL 4370074, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 24, 2008). 
52. Id. at *20. 
53. W. Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1130 (D. Nev. 
2008) (sage grouse). 
54. The acronym “Rx” means prescribed fire. The gray bars represent the acres burned by fed-
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 As Figure 1 indicates, the acreage treated with prescribed fire 
nearly doubled between 1998 and 2011.55 Specifically, between 1998 
and 2003, the acres burned by prescribed fire increased from 
approximately 0.8 million acres to 1.86 million acres. Since 2003, the 
acreage burned has remained near the 2003 level, but the number of 
individual prescribed fires has fluctuated. This increased use of 
prescribed fire resulted from the modern realization that the 
reintroduction of fire is necessary for the survival of ecosystems and for 
community protection.56 However, as the use of prescribed fire 
increased, the federal agencies struggled to use consistent terminology to 
discuss and differentiate prescribed fire from wildfire.  
III. THE NEED FOR CONSISTENT TERMINOLOGY 
Sometimes it takes a human generation for the public’s collective mind 
to change on an issue. 
—Andy Kerr (circa 2006)57  
 In the 1960s and 1970s, as the federal land agencies transitioned 
from fire suppression to fire management classifying fires became 
important. The federal land agencies classified fires into two categories: 
a prescribed fire or a wildfire.58 That initial classification determined 
what type of response was appropriate.59 For example, if a land manager 
classified the reported fire as a wildfire, then firefighters suppressed it. 
Alternatively, if the reported fire was actually a prescribed fire and still 
within the purview of the prescribed fire plan, the federal land agency 
managed the prescribed fire pursuant to that prescribed fire plan. 
However, if the reported fire was not a prescribed fire and if the land 
manager decided to not suppress the fire for ecologic or fuel reduction 
reasons, the fire did not fit into either of the wildfire or prescribed fire 
categories. Sometimes land managers called that type of fire “wildland 
fire use,” “fire use,” “prescribed natural fire,” “natural prescribed fire,” 
                                                                                                             
ducted. NIFC Fire Statistics, supra note 9 (describing that national prescribed fire reporting began in 
1998, and thus, national prescribed fire data that occurred before 1998 is not available); 1988 FIRE 
MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 7 (stating that prescribed fire has been used in 
Florida since the 1950s). 
55. See NIFC Fire Statistics, supra note 9. 
56. DOUGLAS J. MARSHALL ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., SYNTHESIS OF KNOWLEDGE OF 
HAZARDOUS FUELS MANAGEMENT IN LOBLOLLY PINE FORESTS, at ii (Nov. 2008), available at 
http://www.firescience.gov/projects/05-S-04/project/05-S-04_gtr_srs110_synth_loblollypine.pdf. 
57. Andy Kerr, The Ultimate Firefight: Changing Hearts and Minds, in WILDFIRE: A 
CENTURY OF FAILED FOREST POLICY 277 (George Wuerthner ed., 2006). 
58. 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 5. 
59. Id. at 5–9. 
290 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:279 
or a “wildfire managed for resource benefit.”60 Thus, the lack of 
consistent terminology is unnecessarily complicating and confusing.61 
 The absence of consistent terminology still creates confusion 
amongst the public, the courts, and the federal land agencies.62 In  2010, 
the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, a group composed of federal 
land agency fire leadership with policy making authority,63 issued a 
policy guidance and interpretation memorandum, NWCG#030-2010, 
explaining the new fire management and terminology changes:  
 The most effective way for us to communicate about fire with 
the public is to educate ourselves about what to say and how to say 
it, and allow each agency and partner to address its own audiences. 
 . . . . 
 For both our internal and external audiences, we need to keep 
our terminology simple and continue to focus on telling our story 
versus getting caught up in explaining the difference between 
unplanned and planned ignitions and between wildfires and 
prescribed fires.64  
 Although the various classification definitions may appear facially 
insignificant, the classification provides guidance to whether the federal 
land agency’s actions likely fall within the discretionary function 
exemption to the Federal Tort Claims Act.65 As described in Part IV, 
infra, if a court finds that the federal land agency acted pursuant to 
proper discretion, then any tort claim for money damages terminates 
because the court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction.66 For 
                                                 
60. Van Wagtendonk, supra note 19 (describing that fire managers have attempted to curtail 
the use of terms like “prescribed natural fire” and “wildland fire use”). 
61. Ronald H. Wakimoto, National Fire Management Policy, J. FORESTRY, Oct. 1990, at 22, 
25 (appointed to review the national wildland fire policy after the 1988 Greater Yellowstone fires 
and concluded that “developing uniform terminology . . . would significantly improve fire manage-
ment”). 
62. NWCG#030-2010, supra note 12. 
63. In 1943, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing “to provide adequate wildfire management and protection to the lands under their respec-
tive jurisdictions.” Then in 1976, those two departments established the NWCG. The purpose of the 
NWCG, as a national group, “is to provide national leadership and establish, implement, maintain 
and communicate policy, standards, guidelines, and qualifications for wildland fire program man-
agement and support the National Incident Management System.” Memorandum of Understanding 
for the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (Oct. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.nwcg.gov/general/mou2007.htm. 
64. NWCG#030-2010, supra note 62, at 1, 3. 
65. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011); Florida v. United States, No. 4:09-
CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2010). 
66. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332, 334 (10th Cir. 1991) (dismissing negligence 
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the National Park Service’s actions in conducting 
a rescue fell within the discretionary function exception). 
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example, a federal land agency should succeed in defending a damages 
claim resulting from the agency’s response to a wildfire by using the 
discretionary function exception, but the discretionary function exception 
is not likely to shield a prescribed fire damages claim.67 
 Ultimately, the classification of wildland fire has changed as federal 
land agencies react to political pressure and as land managers 
characterized fire management.68 Regardless of the various 
classifications, wildfires are distinguishable by their cause and by the 
management response. The following describes the two interrelated 
classification schemes and concludes by reiterating the need to use 
consistent terminology.  
A. Classification of Fire by Cause 
 Currently, a federal land agency’s response to a wildland fire is 
primarily dictated by the cause of the fire: (1) whether the fire was 
intentionally ignited and (2) whether the igniter, the person who actually 
started the fire, had authority to ignite the fire.69 
 A prescribed fire is a human-caused fire intentionally ignited, with 
authority, to achieve specific objectives identified in an approved 
prescribed fire plan.70 In 2010, the National Wildfire Coordinating 
Group (NWCG) further defined prescribed fire as a “planned ignition,” 
but that characterization did not change the definition.71 Prescribed fire is 
also synonymous with “prescribed burn.”72 However, federal land 
agencies should terminate the use of other colloquial prescribed fire 
terms, specifically “controlled burn,” “prescribed natural fire,” and 
“natural prescribed fire.” 
 The term “controlled burn” is misleading and inaccurate.73 
Although a prescribed fire is conducted pursuant to specific weather and 
fuel prescriptions, neither the fire nor the weather are controllable. For 
                                                 
67. Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the discretionary function 
exception barred recovery resulting from property damage caused by multiple lightning ignited 
wildfires); Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *5 (holding the discretionary function exception did not 
bar recovery resulting from property damage caused by an escaped prescribed fire). 
68. See NWCG#030-2010, supra note 62, at 1. 
69. Id. at 3 (recognizing wildland fire to be either (1) wildfire: unplanned ignitions; or (2) pre-
scribed fire: planned ignitions).  
70. GLOSSARY, supra note 36, at 139 (defining prescribed fire). 
71. Memorandum from the NWCG Chair to NWCG Committee Chairs and Geographic Area 
Coordinating Group, NWCG#024-2010, Attachment A, at 5 (Apr. 30, 2010) [hereinafter 
NWCG#024-2010], available at http://www.nwcg.gov/general/memos/nwcg-024-2010.html; see, 
e.g., Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921 (D. Wyo. 1995). 
72. NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71 (stating that “prescribed burn” is a synonym for pre-
scribed fire). 
73. Contra id. (stating that “controlled burn” is a synonym for prescribed fire). 
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example, wind shifts commonly cause prescribed fires to escape the 
prescribed area,74 or a prescribed fire can burn something within the 
prescribed area that was specifically not intended to burn.75 Thus, 
because humans cannot control the weather or where an ember travels, 
the federal land agencies should not use the term “controlled burn” to 
describe a prescribed fire. Instead, the federal land agencies should 
simply use the term prescribed fire. 
 Additionally, the use of the terms “prescribed natural fire” or 
“natural prescribed fire” should also be discouraged because the terms 
are misleading and inaccurate. During the 1980s, the federal land 
agencies used the terms “prescribed natural fire” or “natural prescribed 
fire” to describe a fire ignited by lightning that was not suppressed.76 
Some federal land agencies, like the USFS, still classify fires ignited by 
lightning and not suppressed as a “prescribed natural fire” or a “natural 
prescribed fire.”77 Pursuant to the prescribed fire definition and as 
emphasized by the NWCG#030-2010, fires started by lightning are not 
human-caused and are not prescribed fires. If a term is used, it should be 
wildfire because only wildfire encompasses unplanned ignitions.78 Thus, 
because a “prescribed natural fire” or a “natural prescribed fire” is not a 
prescribed fire, the terms inaccurately describe a prescribed fire, and 
their use should be curtailed. 
 Additionally, by using inaccurate, misleading, and inconsistent 
terms the federal land agencies may face an unnecessary burden to prove 
the federal land agencies’ action actually falls within the discretionary 
function exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act.79 As discussed in 
Part IV, infra, if the discretionary function exception applies, then the 
federal court must dismiss the tort claim because the court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction. For example, if the federal land agencies abandoned 
the “prescribed natural fire” classification and referred to the fire as an 
                                                 
74. E.g., Thune, 872 F. Supp. at 922 (describing that the weather changed and the prescribed 
fire escaped). 
75. NAT’L PARK SERV., NPS 72 HOUR REPORT: HOLMES INVESTIGATION 2 (Oct. 5, 2004), 
available at http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/72HrRpt_GrantWestRxFire.pdf  (describing that 
prescribed fire personnel put a fire line around the base of the snag to keep fire away from the tree, 
but a flying ember set fire to the top of the snag). 
76. 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 1, 8. 
77. U.S. FOREST SERV., FSM 2324.22, MANAGEMENT OF FIRE: POLICY (Jan. 22, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/fsm/2300/2320.doc; Florida v. United States, No. 4:09-
CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2010). 
78. NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71, Attachment A, at 7 (defining “wildfire” as an unplanned 
ignition caused by, for example, lightning). 
79. Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (discussing effects of naming classification and Federal 
Tort Claims Act); Bowen v. United States, No. Civ. 99-443-HA, 1999 WL 1074080, at *1 (D. Or. 
Nov. 8, 1999) (improperly classifying a lightning ignited fire as a “prescribed natural fire” that 
should have been classified as a wildfire or more specifically at the time, a wildland fire use). 
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unplanned fire or wildfire, the federal land agencies’ subsequent actions 
are in response to a fire and not the cause of the fire.80 Generally, a 
federal land agency’s actions responding to a wildfire easily fall under 
the discretionary function exemption.81 
 In contrast to a prescribed fire, most fires are not intentionally 
ignited or are ignited without authority.82 Wildfires result primarily from 
criminal acts, from negligent acts, and from lightning.83 Although 
criminal and negligent acts are beyond the scope of this article, further 
distinguishing lightning-caused fires from prescribed fires will provide 
some historical clarification. As discussed earlier, lightning-caused fires 
that were not suppressed were historically classified as either “prescribed 
natural fires” or “natural prescribed fires.” After the significant criticism 
resulting from the 1988 Greater Yellowstone “prescribed natural fires,” 
the federal land agencies reclassified those unplanned and unsuppressed 
fires as “Wildland Fire Use” (WFU).84 
 A WFU was a lightning-caused ignition, unintentional and 
unplanned, that was allowed to burn within established areas to achieve 
specific resource management objectives pursuant to a fire management 
plan.85 Fire management plans provide, an individual unit within a 
federal land agency, direction and policy guidance to manage the entire 
wildland fire program on that unit.86 Fire management plans also provide 
                                                 
80. See, e.g., McDougal v. U.S. Forest Serv., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Or. 2002) (improperly 
calling a lightning ignited fire a “prescribed natural fire” but properly holding the discretionary 
function exception barred action). 
81. Id. 
82. For example, in 2010 the ratio of unplanned fires (wildfires) to planned fires (prescribed 
fires) was more than four to one (4:1). NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., 2010 NATIONAL REPORT OF 
WILDLAND FIRES AND ACRES BURNED BY STATE 70 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/intelligence/2010_statssumm/fires_acres.pdf (describing 
71,971 wildfires and 16,882 prescribed fires). 
83. NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71, Attachment A, at 7 (defining wildfire). 
84. 1988 FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY REVIEW, supra note 24, at 19 (stating that the NWCG 
was taking the lead in developing common prescribed fire terminology and agencies were to develop 
common terminology for “prescribed natural fire” programs); NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71, at 8 
(describing Wildland Fire Use as an obsolete term).  
85. NWCG#024-2010, supra note 71, at 8 (defining Wildland Fire Use). 
86. For lands managed by the National Park Service, Director’s Order #18 requires as follows: 
Each park with burnable vegetation must have an approved Fire Management Plan that 
will address the need for adequate funding and staffing to support its fire management 
program. Parks having an approved Fire Management Plan and accompanying National 
Environmental Policy Act compliance may utilize wildland fire to achieve resource bene-
fits in predetermined fire management units. Parks lacking an approved Fire Manage-
ment Plan may not use resource benefits as a primary consideration influencing the selec-
tion of a suppression strategy, but they must consider the resource impacts of suppression 
alternatives in their decisions.  
NAT’L PARK SERV., DIRECTOR’S ORDER #18: WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 3 (Jan. 16, 2008), 
available at http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/fir_wil_do18.pdf.  
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the authority from which hazardous fuel treatments or prescribed fire 
plans derive. Because a WFU fire was only allowed to burn pursuant to 
an approved fire management plan, and prescribed fires are only 
authorized pursuant to an approved prescribed fire plan, the WFU and 
prescribed fire distinction blurred.87 Without knowing the cause of the 
fire, a prescribed fire ignited for ecosystem benefits resembles a WFU 
fire managed for ecosystem benefits: both fires are allowed to burn 
without significant human involvement and are suppressed only when 
the fire breached some predetermined criteria. In practice, however, the 
federal land agencies created strict policies that virtually prevented a 
wildland fire—wildfire, WFU, or otherwise—from being managed for 
multiple objectives.  
B. Classification of Fire by Response Instead of by Cause 
 In 2010, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) 
determined that federal land agencies should abandon the traditional fire 
classification by cause and, instead, describe a fire by the federal land 
agencies’ response.88 The NWCG emphasized that classifying fires by 
cause unnecessarily pigeon-holed the federal land agencies’ ability to 
manage a wildland fire because once a fire was classified as a wildfire, 
which mandated aggressive suppression strategies, the fire could not then 
be managed for multiple objectives.89 In practice, the traditional policy 
meant a wildfire that was suppressed had to be completely suppressed; 
the fire could not also have a portion that was allowed to burn for 
ecosystem benefits. In contrast, the 2010 policy approach involves an 
individual fire assessment and allows land managers to adapt the federal 
land agency’s response to the specific circumstances observed and 
forecasted for that individual fire. This new policy shift toward 
                                                                                                             
For lands managed by the U.S. Forest Service, Forest Service Handbook 5109.19 requires “[e]ach 
National Forest with burnable vegetation must have an approved fire management plan (sec. 52.2) 
that has been prepared, reviewed, and approved annually in conformance with requirements set out 
in [U.S. Forest Service Manuals and Handbooks.]” U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE 
HANDBOOK—FIRE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS AND PLANNING HANDBOOK 4 (Jan. 10, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.fs.fed.us/cgi-bin/Directives/get_dirs/fsh?5109.19 (the document is entitled 
“5109.19_50.doc” and the section is entitled “50.3 Policy”). 
87. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 3:02-CV-02708, 2003 WL 22283969, at *2 
n.3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2003) (improperly calling a naturally ignited fire as a prescribed fires). 
88. NWCG#030-2010, supra note 62, at 4. 
89. Id. at 5; WILDLAND FIRE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, 2008 MODIFICATION TO THE 
INTERAGENCY STRATEGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 
POLICY (May 2, 2008), available at http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/in
dex.htm. 
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individual fire assessments resulted from a policy experimentation 
approved by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC) in 2008.90 
 The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security created and authorized the WFLC. The 
WFLC is composed of presidential appointees and elected officials and 
is the intergovernmental committee that guides the implementation and 
coordination of federal wildland fire policy.91 
 The recent WFLC policy and NWCG terminology changes allow 
land managers the needed flexibility to suppress portions of a lightning-
caused fire and to allow a fire to burn for ecosystem benefit in other 
areas.92 For example, if a lightning-caused fire starts near a community 
and then spreads into a designated wilderness area that has an approved 
fire management plan, instead of complete suppression as required prior 
to the WFLC 2008 policy, that fire can now be suppressed adjacent to 
the community and managed for ecosystem benefits within the 
wilderness.93 This new approach appropriately balances the need to 
protect communities while allowing fires to burn in wilderness areas 
where the Wilderness Act specifically restricts human modification of 
natural processes. 
 The new multiple objective policy also strikes the appropriate 
balance for prescribed fire. Specifically, this policy changes how 
prescribed fires are managed, especially when a prescribed fire escapes a 
designated area. Prior to the WFLC 2008 policy, once a prescribed fire 
escaped, the entire prescribed fire was converted to a wildfire and 
aggressively suppressed.94 Now, the WFLC 2008 policy still converts the 
escaped prescribed fire into a wildfire, but if portions of the fire are still 
achieving the intent of the prescribed fire and are not threatening other 
resources, those portions do not have to be suppressed. This change 
allows land managers to effectively suppress threatening portions of the 
fire to resolve any public fear, while not committing destructive 
suppression actions within the original prescribed fire area. 
 In conclusion, the federal land managers responsible for wildland 
fire programs should welcome the recent fire terminology and policy 
                                                 
90. WILDLAND FIRE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 89. 
91. Memorandum of Understanding Wildland Fire Leadership Council (Apr. 12, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/leadership/documents/mou_wflc_april2010.pdf. 
92. 2012 REDBOOK, supra note 30, at 09-3 (PDF page 178) (describing that human-caused 
wildfires will be suppressed at the lowest cost with the fewest negative consequences with respect to 
firefighter and public safety). 
93. Van Wagtendonk, supra note 19 (describing that as a result of the policy changes wilder-
ness will continue “to be the primary area where wildfires are allowed to burn” because of the re-
moteness and preference for ecological processes to proceed without human intervention). 
94. WILDLAND FIRE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 89. 
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changes. During a time when policies could have further limited a land 
manager’s discretion, the recent Wildland Fire Leadership Council’s 
policy change actually encourages discretion and strikes an appropriate 
balance between community protection and ecosystem health. Federal 
land managers now have the option to aggressively suppress a portion of 
a fire while appropriately allowing another portion of the fire to burn 
naturally.95 This adaptive management approach will likely enable the 
federal land agencies to reestablish fire in fire dependent ecosystems and 
reduce government spending associated with costly fire suppression. To 
better communicate this new adaptive management policy change, the 
National Wildfire Coordinating Group revised the fire terminology to 
consistently and accurately describe a federal land agency’s approach to 
fire management. The new terminology and classification policy will 
also minimize confusion during any subsequent legal challenge under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act.  
IV. PRESCRIBED FIRE AND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
It is a legal document . . . with all the information needed to implement 
the prescribed fire. Prescribed Fire projects must be implemented in 
compliance with the written plan. 
—National Wildfire Coordinating Group (2008)96 
A. Overview 
 When a prescribed fire escapes, especially a prescribed fire 
conducted to reduce the threat of a wildfire near private property, 
property damage claims may result.97 Those resulting tort claims, when 
brought against an agency of the federal government, face an unusual 
                                                 
95. Contra Karen M. Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 445, 476 n.162 (2010) (discussing the same source as identified in supra note 62 and positing 
that NWCG#030-2010 was used to facilitate media attention and prolong fire durations). 
96. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16; 2012 REDBOOK, supra note 30 (describing 
the 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE is still binding through 2012). 
97. E.g., Michigan v. United States, No. 2:11-CV-00303, 2011 WL 7267049 (W.D. Mich. filed 
Aug. 12, 2011) (currently litigating a motion to dismiss based on the discretionary function excep-
tion because a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire—broadcast burning—escaped and allegedly dam-
aged state lands valued at $85,000); Wipf v. United States, No. 5:09-CV-05033, 2010 WL 3333540 
(D. S.D. settled Sept. 16, 2010) (plaintiff alleged $346,056 in property damage resulting from an 
escaped prescribed fire—pile burning—that the U.S. Forest Service conducted); Martini v. United 
States, No. 0:04-CV-03518, 2005 WL 3024645 (D. Minn. dismissed by stipulation Jan. 9, 2006) 
(plaintiff alleged $22,000 in property damage resulting from an escaped prescribed fire—broadcast 
burning—that the U.S. Forest Service conducted); Richardson v. United States, No. 1:03-CV-03177, 
2004 WL 3333253 (D. S.C. settled Jan. 20, 2005) (plaintiff alleged prescribed fire plan was too 
liberal and also alleged $138,000 in property damage resulting from an escaped prescribed fire—
broadcast burning—that the U.S. Forest Service conducted). 
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procedural and substantive hurdle: the discretionary function exception 
to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the 
United States’ sovereign immunity for negligence suits involving federal 
government employees.98 However, that waiver is limited by the 
discretionary function exception. If the federal agency’s conduct falls 
within the discretionary function exception, then the tort claim is 
dismissed because the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.99 
Thus, the discretionary function exception shields the federal 
government from liability only in limited circumstances. While the 
Federal Tort Claims Act provides the traditional means to recover 
monetary damages, some parties harmed by an escaped prescribed fire 
have also recovered monetary damages through the political process. 
 Two escaped prescribed fires—the Lowden Ranch fire in California 
and the Cerro Grande fire in New Mexico—spurred hundreds of 
individual damage claims.100 Surprisingly, nearly all of those claims, 
which cost the United States more than $1 billion, settled out-of-court 
and without litigating the discretionary function exception.101  
 In 1999, the Bureau of Land Management planned and ignited a 
100-acre prescribed fire, the Lowden Ranch prescribed fire, to reduce the 
spread of noxious weeds near Redding, California.102 Pursuant to Bureau 
of Land Management policy, a prescribed fire plan was drafted that 
included specific conditions, or prescriptions, which had to be satisfied 
before the prescribed fire was ignited.103 With wind speeds exceeding the 
                                                 
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2011) (stating waiver of sovereign immunity for negligence suits); 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011) (stating what is called the discretionary function exception); e.g., United 
States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995) (describing that an ambiguity resulting from a waiver 
of sovereign immunity is to be construed in favor of immunity); Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d 
951, 952 (10th Cir. 1991) (describing that the waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by the discre-
tionary function exception). 
99. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332, 334 (10th Cir. 1991) (dismissing negligence 
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the National Park Service’s actions in conducting 
a rescue fell within the discretionary function exception). 
100. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., LOWDEN RANCH PRESCRIBED FIRE REVIEW 6 (July 22, 
1999) [hereinafter LOWDEN REVIEW], available at http://www.nationalfiretraining.net/userfiles/Grea
tBasin/Erin/lowden_escaped_rx_review.pdf; NAT’L PARK SERV., CERRO GRANDE PRESCRIBED FIRE 
BOARD OF INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, at ii (Feb. 26, 2001) [hereinafter CERRO GRANDE 
INQUIRY], available at http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Cerro%20Grande%20Final%20Report
%202001.pdf. 
101. BARRY T. HILL, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-00-257, FIRE 
MANAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CERRO GRANDE (LOS ALAMOS) FIRE 2 (2000) [here-
inafter GAO CERRO GRANDE], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108587.pdf (describing 
that the fire burned about 48,000 acres and damages were estimated at $1 billion). 
102. LOWDEN REVIEW, supra note 100, at 10 (describing a prescribed fire of 100-acres at 
Lowden Ranch ignited in an effort to eliminate star thistle and improve the ecosystem). 
103. Held v. Dep't of the Interior, SF-0752-00-0298-I-1, 2002 WL 31305205, at ¶3 (M.S.P.B. 
Sept. 30, 2002) (describing that the prescribed fire plan defined the maximum allowable wind speed 
and the number of required fire engines). 
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maximum prescription and without sufficient fire engines, the prescribed 
fire was ignited.104 Consequently, within three hours of ignition the 
prescribed fire escaped and a wildfire was declared.105 Eventually, the 
fire was suppressed, and the federal government alone spent nearly $20 
million to suppress it.106 In addition, over 350 tort claims were filed 
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act after the Lowden Ranch 
prescribed fire burned over 2,000 acres and damaged twenty-three 
homes.107 Although the vast majority of the cases appear to have settled, 
a few cases proceeded through motion practice and likely settled without 
trial.108 Interestingly, of the reported cases and briefs, the United States 
did not invoke the discretionary function exception to shield the Bureau 
of Land Management from liability.109 Thus, for the victims of the 
Lowden Ranch prescribed fire, the United States settled smaller claims 
through the administrative process110 and larger claims pursuant to the 
Treasury’s Judgment Fund process.111   
 Rather than use the Federal Tort Claims Act, the victims of the 
Cerro Grande fire used a special victim compensation statute that 
Congress quickly enacted as an alternate process to settle damage claims. 
In particular, the National Park Service prepared and approved a 
prescribed fire plan to reduce hazard fuels in Bandelier National 
Monument, New Mexico.112 On May 4, 2000, the National Park Service 
ignited the Cerro Grande prescribed fire to burn up to 900 acres, but the 
                                                 
104. Id.; LOWDEN REVIEW, supra note 100, at 27–29 (describing wind speeds exceeded maxi-
mum allowable and only one fire engine, of the required four, was onsite). 
105. LOWDEN REVIEW, supra note 100, at 14–15 (describing the prescribed fire was ignited at 
10:50 AM and a wildfire was declared by 1:00 PM). 
106. Held, 2002 WL 31305205, at ¶2. 
107. Robinson v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (describing more 
than 350 other claims and three other cases were pending). 
108. E.g., id. at 1218 n.2 (describing that this decision will likely help resolve more than 100 
similar cases); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 3, Trinity County v. United States, No. 02-16654, 
2002 WL 32625738 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing that the United States offered to settle during the 
administrative process). 
109. Robinson, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1215; Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 3, Trinity County v. 
United States, No. 02-16654, 2002 WL 32625738 (9th Cir. 2002). 
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2011) (describing that the head of the appropriate federal agency may 
settle and pay up to $2,500 for a tort claim during the administrative process); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) 
(2011) (describing that the claimant must initially submit the tort claim to the appropriate federal 
agency, which then has six months to settle or deny the claim, before the claim may be filed in 
court); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (2011) (describing that Standard Form 95 can initiate the administrative 
tort claim). 
111. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2011) (describing the judgment fund’s application for claims greater 
than the $2,500 payable by the agency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672); The Judgment Fund Back-
ground, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Mar. 11, 2011), http://fms.treas.gov/judgefund/background.html.  
112. CERRO GRANDE INQUIRY, supra note 100, at 6 (describing the prescribed fire plans for 
Upper Frijoles burn units, which later became known as the Cerro Grande prescribed fire). 
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prescribed fire escaped.113 By the time the resulting wildfire was 
contained on May 19, it had burned nearly 48,000 acres, caused damages 
amounting to $1 billion, and damaged 235 structures including parts of 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory.114 The National Park Service 
openly admitted responsibility for the damages caused by the prescribed 
fire, and Congress responded by appropriating more than $660 million to 
compensate injured victims.115 Because Congress passed the victim 
compensation statute on July 13, 2000—less than two months after the 
fire was contained—those injured parties never had to use the Federal 
Tort Claims Act to litigate tort liability.116 Thus, if a federal land agency 
openly admits responsibility for the damages and if Congress enacts a 
special victim compensation fund, then injured parties of a prescribed 
fire do not need the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
 Even though injured parties from the escaped Cerro Grande 
prescribed fire successfully recovered damages through non-judicial 
methods, future injured parties should not have to rely on the enactment 
of special legislation. Congress specifically enacted the Federal Tort 
Claims Act to accord injured parties a reliable recovery opportunity. 
 Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to provide 
injured parties a mechanism to remedy damages by waiving the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity.117 However, Congress did not 
completely waive the United States’ sovereign immunity with the 
passage of the FTCA. Indeed, the FTCA included a preliminary 
threshold requirement that divests a federal court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.118 That threshold bar is known as the discretionary function 
                                                 
113. GAO CERRO GRANDE, supra note 101, at 2–4 (describing the Cerro Grande prescribed 
fire started on May 4 and was substantially contained by May 19). 
114. Id. at 2 (describing that the fire burned about 48,000 acres and damages were estimated at 
$1 billion); CERRO GRANDE INQUIRY, supra note 100, at ii (destroying more than 235 structures and 
damaging other resources including the Los Alamos National Laboratory). 
115. CERRO GRANDE INQUIRY, supra note 100, at ii (describing the National Park Service ad-
mission of responsibility); Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act, Pub. L. 106-246, div. C, §§ 101–106, 
114 Stat. 511, 582–590 (July 13, 2000) (appropriating more than $660 million to remedy damages). 
116. The federal courts adjudicated two cases related to the Cerro Grande prescribed fire, but 
they did not involve tort claims. One case involved a disputed settlement agreement derived from 
the victim compensation fund. Evans-Carmichael v. United States, 343 Fed. App’x 294 (10th Cir. 
2009). The other case involved criminal charges resulting from fraudulent attempts to receive victim 
compensation funds. United States v. Medley, 476 F.3d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 2007).  
117. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 535 (1988) (indicating the FTCA partially 
waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity). 
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011) (discretionary function exception to the FTCA); Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17–18 (1953) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2680 limits subject matter juris-
diction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). 
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exception, and federal land agencies have used it extensively in response 
to damage claims caused by wildfires and prescribed fires.119 
 The discretionary function exception is a powerful shield for the 
federal government. Regardless of the underlying negligence action, 
once a federal land agency successfully convinces a federal district court 
that the discretionary function exception applies, the case is dismissed 
without the court even considering the underlying negligence claim.120 
However, even if the plaintiff ousts the government from behind the 
discretionary function exception shield, the plaintiff must still prove the 
underlying negligence action to the court.121 Because the discretionary 
function exception has been used and construed so favorably for the 
federal government, the number of prescribed fire related tort claims that 
exposed the government from behind that shield was almost nonexistent 
until recently. 
 In Florida v. United States, decided in 2010, the district court 
appropriately concluded the discretionary function exception did not 
apply to a prescribed fire tort claim, and the rationale used in that 
decision will likely alter the way future courts construe the discretionary 
function exception as applied to prescribed fire.122 Specifically, when a 
federal land agency actually creates the fire hazard by intentionally 
igniting a prescribed fire pursuant to a non-discretionary prescribed fire 
plan and that prescribed fire consequently escapes and causes harm, 
courts should follow the rationale used in Florida and conclude the 
discretionary function exception does not apply.123 That conclusion best 
comports with Congress’ intent in enacting the FTCA, the recent line of 
prescribed fire cases, and the Supreme Court’s precedent.  
                                                 
119. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the discre-
tionary function exception applied to the USFS resulting from wildfire spreading from national 
forest to private ranch); Backfire 2000 v. United States, 273 Fed. App’x 661 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
the discretionary function exception applied to the USFS's decision to set backfires while combating 
a wildfire); Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding the discretionary 
function exception barred personal property damages claim resulting from an escaped prescribed 
fire). 
120. Layton v. United States, 984 F.2d 1496, 1502 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Whether these employees 
were negligent in making any of these decisions is irrelevant.”); Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 
1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that the discretionary function exception applies even when the 
acts constitute an abuse of discretion); Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 
1029 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that negligence is simply irrelevant to the discretionary function 
exception inquiry). 
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (describing that there is no right to a jury trial under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 700 n.10 (1961) (describing no right to a jury 
trial). 
122. Florida v. United States, No. 4:09-CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 
2010). 
123. Id. 
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B. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
 In 1948,124 Congress enacted the FTCA as a means of holding the 
federal government liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as 
a private individual under like circumstances.”125 Yet, Congress retained 
sovereign immunity for certain discretionary government functions.126 
Additionally, the FTCA provides the federal courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction of all civil claims seeking monetary damages against the 
United States:  
[To all civil actions for money damages] accruing on and after 
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or 
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his 
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States 
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance 
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.127  
 However, if the alleged tort derived from a permissible exercise of 
policy judgment, then the discretionary function exception shields the 
government from liability, and the court is divested of subject matter 
jurisdiction.128 Specifically, the discretionary function exception to the 
FTCA provides the following:  
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall 
not apply to— 
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the 
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or 
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
                                                 
124. In 1948, Congress repealed the 1946 version of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and Con-
gress also reenacted the Federal Tort Claims Act as it substantively appears today. Compare 28 
U.S.C. § 1346 (2011) (enacted June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 933), and 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2011) 
(enacted June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982), with United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 
(1963) (describing that the Federal Tort Claims Act was part of the Legislative Reorganization Act 
of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (Aug. 2, 1946) and was intended to “eliminate the burden on Congress 
of investigating and passing upon private bills seeking individual relief.”). 
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2011). 
126. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 
797, 808 (1984). 
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2011).  
128. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988) (describing that the discretionary 
function exception insulates the government from liability from permissive discretionary acts); 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17–18 (1953) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2680 limits subject 
matter jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)); Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1249–
50 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that if the discretionary function exception is satisfied, then the federal 
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction). 
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agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused.129  
 Thus, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act as a means of 
providing injured parties an opportunity to recover damages caused by 
the federal government. However, because the FTCA did not specifically 
define “a discretionary function,” the Supreme Court has had the 
opportunity to interpret the meaning of the discretionary function 
provision. 
1. The Berkovitz Two-Pronged Test 
 In Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated a two-
pronged test to determine whether the alleged tortious government action 
falls within the limited confines of the discretionary function 
exception.130 In particular, the Berkovitz Court provided the following 
principles for lower courts to use when analyzing whether the 
discretionary function exception applies: 
This exception . . . marks the boundary between Congress’ 
willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its 
desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to 
suit by private individuals . . . it is the nature of the conduct, rather 
than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary 
function exception applies in a given case.131  
 Although the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting sufficient 
evidence to establish an issue of material fact, the government bears the 
burden of proving both prongs of the discretionary function exception.132 
Thus, if the court concludes that the government failed to satisfy either 
prong, the discretionary function exception does not apply.133 
 First, a court determines whether the government employee’s 
conduct is a matter of judgment or choice.134 The discretionary function 
exception does not apply where “a federal statute, regulation, or policy 
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow 
                                                 
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2011). 
130. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536–37. 
131. Id. at 536. 
132. Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the plaintiff’s and 
the government’s burdens); McDougal v. U.S. Forest Serv., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1232 (D. Or. 
2002). 
133. Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1454 n.10 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that if the 
government fails to satisfy the second part of the two-part test, the court does not need to address 
whether the government satisfied the first part of the test). 
134. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 
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because the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the 
directive.”135  
 Second, if the conduct involved an element of judgment, then the 
court determines whether “that judgment is of the kind that the 
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”136 The 
Supreme Court has construed this prong as preserving the separation of 
federal powers; Congress created the discretionary function exception 
“to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative 
decisions grounded in social, economic, or political policy through the 
medium of an action in tort.”137 In particular, the Gaubert Court 
provided the following example to show that not all discretionary acts 
fall within the discretionary function example:  
There are obviously discretionary acts performed by a Government 
agent that are within the scope of his employment but not within the 
discretionary function exception because these acts cannot be said 
to be based on the purposes that the regulatory regime seeks to 
accomplish. If one of the officials involved in this case drove an 
automobile on a mission connected with his official duties and 
negligently collided with another car, the exception would not 
apply. Although driving requires the constant exercise of discretion, 
the official's decisions in exercising that discretion can hardly be 
said to be grounded in regulatory policy.138 
Thus, once a mandatory directive prescribes a course of action, like 
obeying traffic laws in the Gaubert example, that directive terminates 
any further use of discretion the employee originally had because the 
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. Therefore, 
the discretionary function exception protects only governmental actions 
and decisions based on a permissible exercise of policy judgment.  
2. Applying the Discretionary Function Exception to Prescribed Fire 
 The federal land agencies have used the discretionary function 
exception extensively in response to damages caused by wildfire, but 
                                                 
135. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991); Miller, 163 F.3d at 593 (citing 
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). But see Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“[T] he presence of a few, isolated provisions cast in mandatory language does not transform an 
otherwise suggestive set of guidelines into binding agency regulations.”). 
136. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536–37. 
137. Id. 
138. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 n.7; Duke v. Dep't of Agric., 131 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 
1997) (concluding the discretionary function exception did not apply to a U.S. Forest Service deci-
sion not to warn campers of danger from rolling boulders); Caplan v. United States, 877 F.2d 1314, 
1316 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that the discretionary function exception would not apply when a fed-
eral employee runs a red light with a motor vehicle and causes an accident). 
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courts have only adjudicated its use in response to escaped prescribed 
fires in two cases.139 However, the government has asserted the 
discretionary function exception in response to prescribed fire claims at 
least five times, and the plaintiffs recovered through settlement in four of 
the five cases.140 
 Although wildfires and prescribed fires may appear similar, a 
federal land agency’s conduct is completely different between the two. 
On a prescribed fire, the federal land agency’s actions actually create the 
hazard by intentionally igniting the fire. In contrast, on a wildfire, the 
federal land agency’s actions, generally, focus on suppressing fire. 
 In response to a wildfire, the federal land agencies have 
significantly more discretion in deciding which strategy to use: whether 
to suppress the fire in its entirety, whether to allow the fire to burn for 
ecosystem benefits, or whether to choose a combination of suppression 
and natural burning. Additionally, given one of the above responses, a 
federal land agency has significant discretion in choosing tactics and 
where to apply those tactics. For example, a federal land agency could 
choose to use hand crews141 to construct minimal fire breaks, or it could 
choose to deploy heavy equipment into the area to construct expansive 
fire breaks.142 Thus, the federal land agency has discretion when 
responding to a wildfire, but it does not have such discretion when it 
                                                 
139. Florida v. United States, No. 4:09-CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 
30, 2010) (holding the discretionary function exception did not apply and the parties later settled). 
Contra Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding the discretionary function 
exception shielded the United States). 
140. Compare Wipf v. United States, No. 5:09-CV-05033, 2010 WL 3333540 (D. S.D. settled 
Sept. 16, 2010) (plaintiff alleged $346,056 in property damage, the United States asserted the discre-
tionary function exception, but the parties later settled), and Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 
(plaintiff alleged $2.8 million in property damage, the court held the discretionary function excep-
tion did not apply, and the parties later settled), and Martini v. United States, No. 0:04-CV-03518, 
2005 WL 3024645 (D. Minn. dismissed by stipulation Jan. 9, 2006) (plaintiff alleged $22,000 in 
property damage, the United States asserted the discretionary function exception, but the parties later 
settled), and Richardson v. United States, No. 1:03-CV-03177, 2004 WL 3333253 (D. S.C. settled 
Jan. 20, 2005) (plaintiff alleged $138,000 in property damage, the United States asserted the discre-
tionary function exception, and the parties later settled), with Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 
921 (D. Wyo. 1995) (dismissing the $43,000 tort claim because the discretionary function exception 
shielded the United States). See  Michigan v. United States, No. 2:11-CV-00303, 2011 WL 7267049 
(W.D. Mich. filed Aug. 12, 2011) (currently litigating a motion to dismiss based on the discretionary 
function exception because a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire escaped and allegedly damaged 
state lands valued at $85,000). 
141. Traditionally, a hand crew is a twenty-person fire crew outfitted with hand tools like 
shovels and chainsaws. 
142. A fire break involves removal of enough burnable material to prevent a fire from spread-
ing across that line. A fire break constructed by a hand crew, generally, involves removing an eight 
foot swath of vegetation, while a fire break constructed by heavy equipment, like a dozer, is at least 
as wide as the dozer’s blade. 
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intentionally ignites a prescribed fire because of the mandatory 
prescribed fire plan. 
 A federal land agency’s actions involving prescribed fire are on the 
opposite side of the discretionary continuum. Because prescribed fires 
are intentionally ignited, the appropriate inquiries should focus on (1) 
whether the federal land agency planned the prescribed fire pursuant to 
agency directives, and (2) whether the federal land agency implemented 
the prescribed fire in accord with those agency directives and the 
mandatory prescribed fire plan. However, courts have inconsistently 
applied the Berkovitz two-pronged test to prescribed fire claims.  
3. Prescribed Fire Cases 
 In 1995, two prescribed fire tort liability cases were decided that 
reached opposite outcomes—one by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
holding the USFS liable, and the other by the U.S. District Court of 
Wyoming holding the discretionary function exception applied and that 
barred any further litigation.143 Those two cases from 1995 provided 
confusing judicial guidance that lasted until 2010. In 2010, the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Florida broke the fifteen year 
silence by holding the discretionary function exception did not bar 
recovery resulting from a prescribed fire tort claim.144 
a) Anderson: Liability Without a Discretionary Function Exception 
Analysis 
 In Anderson v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded the USFS was liable, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for 
“negligently setting and controlling” the escaped prescribed fire that 
resulted in private property damage.145 
 In Anderson, the USFS and the California Department of Forestry 
planned a 500-acre prescribed fire to reduce the threat of subsequent 
wildfires by removing available fuel.146 This specific prescribed fire 
project was primarily conducted by the USFS to burn highly flammable, 
chaparral, vegetation on the Cleveland National Forest in Southern 
California. In 1990, the USFS ignited the prescribed fire, but on the 
eighth day post-ignition, the prescribed fire, pushed by gusty winds,147 
                                                 
143. Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995); Thune, 872 F. Supp. at 921. 
144. Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *4–5. 
145. Anderson, 55 F.3d at 1382. 
146. Id. at 1380. 
147. Jim Carlton and Ted Johnson, A Summer Siege, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1990, 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1990-06-29/local/me-951_1_carbon-canyon-fire (“The fire jumped 
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escaped and caused at least $4 million in damages to several homes and 
vehicles.148 The appellate court concluded that because a private party 
would be liable under California law for “negligently setting and 
controlling the fire,” the USFS was liable.149 
 Interestingly, the USFS did not assert the discretionary function 
exception,150 and thus the Anderson court did not evaluate the Berkovitz 
two-pronged test.151 Therefore, Anderson stands for the proposition that, 
in a negligence analysis, a federal land agency can be liable for property 
damage resulting from an escaped prescribed fire, but Anderson has 
limited value in discretionary function exception analysis because the 
question was never raised.  
b) Thune: The Discretionary Function Exception Barred the Claim 
 In a similar case, decided the same year as Anderson, a district court 
in another circuit reached a different conclusion. Unlike the appellate 
court in Anderson, the district court in Thune v. United States concluded 
the USFS’s conduct fell within the discretionary function exception.152 
 In Thune, the USFS planned a 3000-acre prescribed fire to improve 
elk habitat in the Bridger-Teton National Forest in northwest 
Wyoming.153 The plaintiff was a hunting guide, operating under a USFS 
license, who maintained a base camp within the national forest.154 In 
1991, the USFS ignited the prescribed fire pursuant to a prescribed fire 
plan.155 During the following afternoon, the wind and weather changed 
and that caused the prescribed fire to escape.156 The government ordered 
evacuations, and following those orders the plaintiff left the area but did 
                                                                                                             
the control line Sunday afternoon, however, and by Wednesday had flared into a raging inferno 
under 105-degree temperatures and high winds, Olson said.”). 
148. Anderson, 55 F.3d at 1380; JACQUES BOURRINET, WILDLAND FIRES AND THE LAW 150 
(1992), available at http://books.google.com (search “Wildland fires and the law”; click on book 
hyperlink; then search “Bedford Fire”) (calling the escaped prescribed fire the Bedford Fire and 
causing more than $4,000,000 in claims against the United States). 
149. Anderson, 55 F.3d at 1382. 
150. Generally, the Assistant United States Attorney requests approval from the appropriate 
Torts Branch staff prior to raising a discretionary function exception. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
MANUAL, TORTS BRANCH PROCEDURES—SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN FTCA LITIGATION 
4-5.220 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title4/5mci
v.htm#4-5.220.  
151. Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 597 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the lack of dis-
cretionary function analysis in Anderson). 
152. Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921 (D. Wyo. 1995). 
153. Id. at 922. 
154. Id. at 922–23. 
155. Id. at 922 (describing the prescribed fire was conducted pursuant to a prescribed fire plan, 
but the Thune decision does not indicate whether the prescribed fire plan was a mandatory di-
rective—like current prescribed fire plans—or an optional guidance document). 
156. Id. at 922–23. 
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not have the necessary six to nine hours to completely pack up his 
camp.157 As a result, the escaped prescribed fire burned the plaintiff’s 
camp causing approximately $43,000 in personal property damage.158 
The plaintiff brought a tort claim alleging the USFS was negligent in (1) 
setting and controlling the fire, and (2) providing insufficient evacuation 
notice.159 
 The district court, however, dismissed the tort claim because it 
concluded the USFS’s conduct fell within the discretionary function 
exception.160 The district court applied the Berkovitz two-pronged test 
and determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the 
USFS ignited the prescribed fire based on a number of fuel, weather, and 
policy factors that required the USFS to make discretionary judgments, 
and (2) those discretionary judgments were based on the public policy to 
improve elk habitat.161 Thus, the Thune court completed both prongs of 
the Berkovitz test and concluded the USFS’s conduct was a permissive 
exercise of discretion. 
 The plaintiff also asserted a claim for inverse condemnation, but he 
later withdrew that claim believing the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction on that issue.162 That second claim was then re-filed 
with the Federal Court of Claims, which later dismissed it for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because it sounded in tort.163 
 Although Thune was decided by a district court, the decision stood 
for the proposition that a federal land agency could use the discretionary 
function exception as a liability shield resulting from a prescribed fire. 
After fifteen years, however, that proposition was severely weakened by 
another district court.  
c) Florida: the Discretionary Function Exception Does Not Apply 
 In stark contrast to the district court in Thune, the district court in 
Florida v. United States determined that the USFS’s conduct in planning 
and implementing the prescribed fire did not fall within the discretionary 
function exception.164 
 In Florida, the USFS planned a 1500-acre prescribed fire to reduce 
the threat of wildfires by removing fuel on the Osceola National Forest 
                                                 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 924. 
160. Id .at 925. 
161. Id. at 924–25. 
162. Id. at 923. 
163. Thune v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 49, 54 (1998). 
164. Florida v. United States, No. 4:09-CV-00386, 2010 WL 3469353, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 
30, 2010). 
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in Florida.165 In 2004, the USFS ignited the prescribed fire, and within a 
few hours USFS staff determined the fire was out of control and not in 
prescription.166 Five days after ignition, the USFS declared the escaped 
prescribed fire a wildfire and began suppression actions.167 The fire 
eventually burned more than 34,000 acres.168 The USFS’s internal 
investigation found (1) the planning and (2) the implementation of the 
initial prescribed fire did not comply with USFS policy directives and (3) 
strong wind gusts contributed to the escape.169 
 The Florida court determined the USFS failed the first prong of the 
Berkovitz two-pronged test because the USFS’s “admissions demonstrate 
a clear disobedience to mandates that are not discretionary. While [the 
USFS] may have had discretion as to the analysis conducted within the 
[Prescribed Fire] Plan, [the USFS] had no judgment or choice whether to 
complete a [Prescribed Fire] Plan and then follow it once approved.”170 
Therefore, Florida stands for the proposition that the discretionary 
function exception does not apply to a tort claim resulting from planning 
or implementing a prescribed fire that later escapes.  
4. Comparing Anderson, Thune, and Florida 
 A court attempting to distinguish the differences among these three 
cases may end up creating holographic distinctions. Factually, all three 
of these cases are identical: all three cases involved the USFS igniting 
large prescribed fires on USFS administered property; all three cases 
involved prescribed fires escaping the prescribed areas and damaging 
private property; and all three prescribed fires escaped as a result of 
changing weather factors, primarily strong gusty winds. 
 Although the fact patterns are identical, the courts reached different 
outcomes by framing the discretionary function exception or liability 
analysis at different moments. The Thune court framed the discretionary 
function exception analysis at the time the USFS decided to actually 
ignite the prescribed fire. The Thune court described that the USFS 
employee initiating the prescribed fire had to use judgment and had to 
                                                 
165. Id  at *4−5; U.S. FOREST SERV., OSCEOLA RANGER DISTRICT COMPARTMENTS 16 AND 1
17 ESCAPED FIRE REVIEW 1−2 (Mar. 19, 2004) [hereinafter OSCEOLA], available at http://training.n
wcg.gov/pre-courses/rx301/Impassable_Bay_Compartments_16_and_117_Review_2004.pdf (de-
scribing that the escaped prescribed fire involved in Florida was initially called the Compartments 
16 and 117 Prescribed Fire and later called the Impassable Bay Fire). 
166. OSCEOLA, supra note 165, at 2. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 1. 
169. Id. at 13–17. 
170. Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *4. 
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make decisions based on weather, seasonal factors,171 but those 
judgments would now be subject to the mandatory prescribed fire plan. 
Unfortunately, the Thune court based its decision on analogy to a 
lightning-caused wildfire case.172 Because the Thune court framed the 
issue by improper analogy to discretionary government conduct in 
response to a wildfire, as opposed to a prescribed fire, the district court 
did not evaluate whether the USFS mandated the employee to plan and 
implement the Thune prescribed fire pursuant to the prescribed fire plan. 
 In contrast, current federal land agency policy now mandates that 
employees must plan and implement prescribed fire pursuant to non-
discretionary requirements.173 Therefore, the rationale used in Thune has 
limited utility because prescribed fire policies have changed significantly 
since 1991, and the current policy specifically delineates a course of 
action that a government employee must follow. 
 The Florida court appropriately framed the issue by not only 
considering the USFS employee’s judgment at the time burning initiated, 
but it also analyzed the overall context. The court primarily evaluated (1) 
whether that specific prescribed fire plan complied with USFS policy 
directives; and (2) whether that specific prescribed fire was implemented 
pursuant to that prescribed fire plan and USFS policy directives. Without 
analyzing whether the USFS was negligent or judicially second guessing 
the USFS’s purpose for the prescribed fire, the court appropriately 
concluded that the USFS did not have “judgment or choice whether to 
complete a [Prescribed Fire] Plan and then follow it once approved.”174 
This contextual distinction is critical to assessing whether the 
government’s conduct fell within the discretionary function exception. 
 When the USFS ignited the prescribed fire in Florida, the USFS 
had mandated planning and implementation directives for prescribed fire 
that the USFS employees failed to follow.175 Because the USFS had 
conducted a thorough escaped-fire investigation and found that its 
employees had failed to follow mandated USFS policies, the USFS 
essentially provided the plaintiffs the necessary evidence to successfully 
defeat a discretionary function exception motion. Since the USFS ignited 
                                                 
171. Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D. Wyo. 1995) (concluding the USFS 
employee had to consider the temperature, the wind, the weather forecast, the season, and other 
considerations, including the broad policy behind the prescribed fire).  
172. Id. at 925 (citing Parsons v. United States, 811 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D. Cal. 1992)) (describ-
ing a lightning ignited wildfire). 
173. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 3 (describing the new requirements as a 
result of the 2003 Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Manage-
ment Policy, which was developed after the 2000 Cerro Grande prescribed fire escape).  
174. Florida, 2010 WL 3469353, at *4. 
175. OSCEOLA, supra note 165, at 4–6. 
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the Florida prescribed fire in 2004, all the federal land agencies have 
actually strengthened their non-discretionary prescribed fire mandates 
and agreed to abide by a mandatory set of prescribed fire planning and 
implementation requirements.176  
5. Prescribed Fire Plans 
 After the 2000 Cerro Grande prescribed fire escape, the federal land 
agencies addressed a number of policy level weaknesses.177 Initially in 
2006, and then again in 2008, the federal land agencies agreed that 
“[p]rescribed fire projects can only be implemented through an approved 
Prescribed Fire Plan.”178 Specifically, the National Park Service, the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, and the U.S. Forest Service agreed that the 2008 
Prescribed Fire Guide would provide “unified direction”179 and set the 
requirements for “what is minimally acceptable for prescribed fire 
planning and implementation.”180 Like other policy documents published 
by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, the 2008 Prescribed Fire 
Guide was drafted by representatives and subject matter experts from the 
federal land agencies and remains in effect until superseded.181 
Additionally, although individual federal land agencies are free to 
impose more restrictive standards and policies directives, the agencies all 
agreed to the minimum mandates articulated in the 2008 Prescribed Fire 
Guide.182 
 In particular, the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide mandates how a 
federal land agency shall plan and implement a prescribed fire. First, the 
2008 Prescribed Fire Guide requires that a thorough planning and 
review process must be conducted to generate a site-specific 
                                                 
176. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 3.  
177. CERRO GRANDE INQUIRY, supra note 100, at i (describing that the 2000 Cerro Grande fire 
exposed a number of policy weaknesses and that the federal land agencies “will provide remedies 
for these problems and strengthen the prescribed fire program at all levels”). 
178. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7. If any prescribed fire was conducted 
after September 2006 but before July 2008, the prior version would be binding. 2006 INTERAGENCY 
PRESCRIBED FIRE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES GUIDE 6 (Sept. 2006), available 
at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/fire/PDF's/rxfireguide.pdf. 
179. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 4.  
180. Id. at 7. The 2006 version also had the same or similar non-discretionary language. 2006 
INTERAGENCY PRESCRIBED FIRE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES GUIDE 6 (Sept. 
2006), available at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/fire/PDF's/rxfireguide.pdf. 
181. 2012 REBOOK, supra note 30 (PDF page 286) (describing the 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE 
GUIDE is still binding through 2012); Memorandum from the NWCG Chair to Interagency Wildland 
Fire Management Personnel, NWCG#015-2008, Interagency Prescribed Fire Planning 
and Implementation Procedures Guide (Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/p
pm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/rx/rx-memo.pdf.  
182. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 7. 
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implementation plan for each prescribed fire.183 During the planning 
process, a federal land agency must draft the prescribed fire plan—the 
site specific implementation plan—using the twenty-one element 
prescribed fire plan template.184 The required template includes the 
following elements and appendices:185  
1. Signature Page 
2. Go/No-Go Checklists 
3. Complexity Analysis 





9. Pre-burn Considerations and Weather 
10. Briefing 
11. Organization and Equipment 
12. Communication 
13. Public and Personnel Safety, Medical 
14. Test Fire 
15. Ignition Plan 
16. Holding Plan 
17. Contingency Plan 
18. Wildfire Conversion 
19. Smoke Management and Air Quality 
20. Monitoring 
21. Post-burn Activities 
22. Appendices 
A. Maps 
B. Technical Review Checklist 
C. Complexity Analysis 
D. Job Hazard Analysis 
E. Fire Behavior Modeling or Empirical Evidence 
Thus, by requiring the drafter of a prescribed fire plan to methodically 
and thoroughly address each element in the template, the federal land 
agencies created a system to minimize prescribed fire escapes to avoid 
an event like the Cerro Grande prescribed fire disaster. 
                                                 
183. Id. at 11. 
184. Id. at 19; e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., REFERENCE MANUAL 18: WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEM
ENT, ch. 7, at 35−36 (2008), available at http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/fir_wil_rm18.pdf (PDF 
pages 147–48) (describing twenty-one element requirement of prescribed fire plans in chapter 7.3). 
185. 2008 PRESCRIBED FIRE GUIDE, supra 16, at 19–27. 
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 After the federal land agency drafts the prescribed fire plan, the 
plan must receive a technical review and approval before ignition 
occurs.186 The technical reviewer must not have actually prepared the 
prescribed fire plan but should have sufficient knowledge of the 
proposed project to ensure the stated objectives can be safely and 
successfully achieved when properly implemented.187 Once the 
prescribed fire plan passes the technical review process, it goes to the 
agency administrator for approval. After the agency administrator 
approves the plan, it becomes the site-specific implementation 
document: the “[p]rescribed fire projects must be implemented in 
compliance with the written plan.”188 Importantly, the prescribed fire 
plan “is a legal document that provides the agency administrator the 
information needed to approve the plan and the Prescribed Fire Burn 
Boss with all the information needed to implement the prescribed 
fire.”189 Because the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide specifically prescribes 
a course of action for planning and implementing a prescribed fire, a 
federal land agency employee has no rightful choice but to adhere to the 
prescribed fire plan. 
 Therefore, when a federal land agency implements a prescribed fire 
and that fire subsequently escapes causing property damage, the federal 
district court should (1) conclude the discretionary function exception 
does not apply and (2) allow the injured party to proceed to litigate 
liability.  
6. FTCA Guidance from the Supreme Court 
 In addition to the current 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has also provided specific guidance to lower courts when 
evaluating a wildland fire tort claim under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.190 Rayonier v. United States represents the Supreme Court’s first, 
and currently only, detailed analysis applying the FTCA to federal 
wildland fire issues.191 
                                                 
186. Id. at 11. 
187. Id. at 12. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 19. 
190. Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957), on remand, Arnhold v. United States, 
284 F.2d 326, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding USFS liable under Washington law for negligently 
failing to control a fire started on federal land), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 876 (1961).  
191. Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Rayonier, 352 U.S. 
at 319–21).  
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 Rayonier involved damage claims resulting from wildfires ignited 
by sparks from a railroad locomotive near Forks, Washington.192 The 
plaintiffs claimed the USFS negligently suppressed the wildfires and 
negligently maintained the property, and that negligence caused harm to 
the plaintiffs.193 While not explicitly described, the government did not 
appear to assert the discretionary function exception, likely because the 
USFS had entered into an agreement to suppress fires in the specific area 
where the fires occurred.194 The district court dismissed the claims for 
failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, yet the district 
court cited a discretionary function exception case for authority.195 The 
Supreme Court, however, vacated and remanded.196 In doing so, the 
Court provided plaintiff friendly guidance to the lower courts when 
evaluating future wildland fire liability pursuant to the FTCA.197 
 In Rayonier, the Court stated “[i]t may be that it is novel and 
unprecedented to hold the United States accountable for the negligence 
of its fire-fighters, but the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to 
waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort 
actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental 
liability.”198 The Supreme Court also stated that although the potential 
damage caused by fires can include burning entire communities and that 
may impose great burdens on the public treasury, Congress believed 
imposing such liability onto the United States was “in the best interest of 
the nation.”199 The Supreme Court also expressed that it will not read 
“exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress,” and “[i]f 
                                                 
192. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 316–17; The Great Forks Fire of 1951, OLYMPIC PENINSULA 
CMTY. MUSEUM, http://content.lib.washington.edu/cmpweb/exhibits/forksfire/index.html (last visit-
ed Jan. 6, 2012) (describing one of the fires ignited due to a logging train traveling on the Port Ange-
les and Western Railroad); Karen M. Bradshaw, Backfired! Distorted Incentives in Wildfire Sup-
pression Techniques, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 163 (2011) (mistakenly stating the fire in Ray-
onier was a prescribed fire when it was actually a wildfire—an unintentional ignition without au-
thority). 
193. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 316–17. 
194. Arnhold v. United States, 284 F.2d 326, 328 (9th Cir. 1960) (“[I]n this case the United 
States had entered into a cooperative agreement, under 16 U.S.C. § 572 and R.C.W. 76.04.400, 
whereby the United States had undertaken to protect all non-United States owned land in the region 
from fire and to take ‘immediate vigorous action’ to control all fires breaking out in the protected 
area.”); Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of Ecology and 
Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 352 (2006) (stating that the United States, curiously, did not assert the 
discretionary function defense in Rayonier). 
195. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 317 (stating that the lower courts cited to Dalehite v. United States, 
346 U.S. 15, 43 (1953) (dismissing because the alleged government conduct fell within the discre-
tionary function exception)). 
196. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 321. 
197. Id. at 319–21. 
198. Id. at 319. 
199. Id. at 319–20. 
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the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body that adopted 
it.”200 Thus, the Supreme Court has expressly provided direction to limit 
the application of the Federal Tort Claims Act waiver of sovereign 
immunity in the specific context of wildland fire. 
 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
should only be applied to prescribed fire claims and not to wildfire 
claims. Unlike the government’s conduct in response to a wildfire, which 
requires a variety of permissive discretionary choices,201 the government 
does not have discretion planning or implementing a prescribed fire. 
During a wildfire response, the government needs discretion to quickly 
evaluate each emergency and determine how to respond. In contrast, the 
government is not entitled to that discretion with a prescribed fire 
because the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide requires the government to plan 
and implement the prescribed fire in accord with the site-specific 
prescribed fire plan.202 Once the government completes a prescribed fire 
plan, the only “choice” it has involves whether to implement the 
prescribed fire, and that fettered decision is regulated by the prescribed 
fire plan. Thus, because the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide specifically 
mandates the planning and implementation of a prescribed fire, a federal 
land agency does not have discretion to ignore those mandates. 
 Therefore, consistent with Florida, the Berkovitz test, the 2008 
Prescribed Fire Guide, and the policies articulated by the Supreme Court 
in Rayonier, the discretionary function exception should not apply to 
prescribed fire tort claims. Specifically, under the first prong of the 
Berkovitz test, a court analyzes whether the federal land agency’s 
conduct in planning and implementing the prescribed fire was a matter of 
judgment or choice. Because the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide provides 
mandatory directives for planning and implementing a prescribed fire, a 
court should conclude the federal land agency employee’s conduct was 
not a matter of judgment or choice. Thus, the discretionary function 
exception does not apply to prescribed fire tort claims. This analysis 
comports with the recent Florida decision and with the limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity articulated in Rayonier. Therefore, when a 
prescribed fire damage claim is brought against the United States, a 
federal land agency should no longer use the discretionary function 
exception as a shield.  
                                                 
200. Id. at 320. 
201. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing 
Rayonier and Anderson regarding the application of the discretionary function exception to wildland 
fire claims); Bradshaw, supra note 95, at 457 (concurring that in response to a wildfire “government 
agencies must make difficult decisions under exigent circumstances”). 
202. See, e.g., Miller, 163 F.3d at 597 (holding the discretionary function exception barred re-
covery resulting from property damage caused by multiple lightning ignited wildfires). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 Although the recent terminology changes may appear insignificant, 
the new terminology and resulting classification scheme will likely 
improve the public’s understanding of both wildfires and prescribed 
fires. It will also simplify any subsequent litigation under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. Because the new terminology clarifies the distinction 
between wildfires and prescribed fires, misleading and inaccurate terms 
such as “controlled burn,” “prescribed natural fire,” or “natural 
prescribed fire” have been shelved. Abandoning those terms will also 
enable a court to better understand the classification distinction between 
prescribed fires and wildfires. Additionally, the new terminology 
describing fires based on the federal land agency’s response will also 
benefit the agency when it asserts the discretionary function exception in 
response to a wildfire. 
 Should a federal court consider a discretionary function exception 
issue involving a prescribed fire, the federal court should combine the 
contextual prescribed fire analysis into the Berkovitz two-pronged test as 
the Florida court did. Under the first prong, the court should analyze 
whether the employee’s prescribed fire planning and implementation was 
a matter of judgment or choice. Because all federal prescribed fires are 
strictly regulated by the prescribed fire plan created pursuant to the 2008 
Prescribed Fire Guide and because all of the federal land agencies have 
adopted and agreed that the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide provides 
mandatory direction, the first prong of the Berkovitz test will always be 
answered in the negative: prescribed fire planning or implementation is 
not discretionary. Thus, a federal land agency employee does not have 
the choice whether to follow the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide’s planning 
and implementation requirements for any prescribed fire, large or small. 
Even if a federal land agency asserts that it had discretion in formulating 
the prescribed fire plan, the 2008 Prescribed Fire Guide also requires 
that the federal land agency employee implement the prescribed fire 
pursuant to the prescribed fire plan. Thus, the 2008 Prescribed Fire 
Guide erodes any permissive discretion the federal land agencies had in 
planning and implementing a prescribed fire. Therefore, the discretionary 
function exception should not bar a claim for damages resulting from a 
prescribed fire. 
 
